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Which Immigrants Are Most Innovative and Entrepreneurial? 
Distinctions by Entry Visa
* 
 
Using the 2003 National Survey of College Graduates, I examine how immigrants perform 
relative to natives in activities likely to increase U.S. productivity, according to the type of visa 
on which they first entered the United States. Immigrants who first entered on a 
student/trainee visa or a temporary work visa have a large advantage over natives in wages, 
patenting, commercializing or licensing patents, and publishing. In general, this advantage is 
explained by immigrants’ higher education and field of study, but this is not the case for 
publishing, and immigrants are more likely to start companies than natives with similar 
education. Immigrants without U.S. education and who arrived at older ages suffer a wage 
handicap, which offsets savings to the United States from their having completed more 
education abroad. Immigrants who entered with legal permanent residence do not outperform 
natives for any of the outcomes considered. 
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There has been considerable public debate over skilled immigration to the United States in
recent years, much of it on the merits or otherwise of the H{1B visa program for specialty
workers and the level of the annual cap on such visas. Hira (2007), Matlo (2002{2003,
2008), Miano (2007), Senator Chuck Grassley R{Iowa1 and others call for a cut in the
H{1B cap, arguing that H{1B workers are not particularly skilled, undercut native wages,
and reduce native employment both directly and by facilitating o{shoring. Critics of the
H{1B also have unfavorable views of the intra{company transferee L visa, while Borjas
(2002) argues that the foreign student program is detrimental to the United States. By
constrast, Kirkegaard (2007), employers (Microsoft2, U.S. Chamber of Commerce3) and
others advocate an increase in the H{1B cap and in skilled immigration more generally
to enable rms to compete in global markets. Along with the Institute for Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (2007), employers call for faster transitions from temporary visas,
including student visas, to legal permanent residence.
The various parties disagree in part because they have dierent objective functions.
However, they also disagree on certain factual matters that have yet to be fully inves-
tigated. For example, economists have an as yet incomplete picture of the aggregate
benets to natives of skilled immigration. In this paper, I address this by providing evi-
dence not merely on skilled immigrants' private productivity, as measured by their wage,
but also on their success in creating, disseminating and commercializing knowledge, ac-
tivities with public benets likely to increase U.S. total factor productivity. Specically,
I examine patenting, commercializing and licensing patents, publishing books and papers
and writing papers for presentation at major conferences, and starting successful com-
panies. I use patents to proxy for inventions, a type of knowledge with the potential to
increase total factor productivity. While in the short run the purpose of a patent is to
1 grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel dataPageID 1502=10956, accessed 8 February 2009.
2 www.microsoft.com/Presspass/exec/billg/speeches/2007/03-07Senate.mspx, accessed 9 February
2009.
3 www.uschamber.com/international/agenda/immigration policies.htm, accessed 9 February 2009.
1keep the benet of an invention private, once the patent expires or is licensed, the inven-
tion may be used by other rms to increase their productivity. Patenting may also be
correlated with innovations embodied in tacit knowledge and disseminated by inter{rm
worker mobility. I use the publication and presentation of books and papers to measure
dissemination of knowledge created both academically and commercially. Since knowl-
edge must be commercialized in order to increase total factor productivity, I seek evidence
of the commercialization of knowledge in the commercialization and licensing of patents,
and in the founding of successful companies.
I distinguish among skilled immigrants according whether they rst came to the United
States as a legal permanent resident, on a temporary work visa, on a student/trainee
visa, or as a dependent of a temporary visa holder, and I further distinguish types of
student/trainee. This makes the results directly informative to policy{makers, who can
use them to inuence their decisions about which visa classes to expand or shrink and
which transitions to legal permanent residence to facilitate. However, I do not undertake
a full cost{benet analysis of skilled immigration's impact, as I do not capture all possible
benets of skilled immigration and I ignore potential negative eects. Borjas (2006b), for
example, calculates that immigrants with PhDs depress the wages of native PhDs.
To the extent that the activities I study have a public good component, skilled immi-
grants might contribute to native welfare simply by increasing the size of the population
likely to engage in them. However, immigrants might outperform natives if a combination
of self{selection and the visa system leads immigrants to be inherently more creative, in-
ventive or entrepreneurial. Alternatively, immigrants may have similar (or lesser) natural
abilities, but be more concentrated in the highest education groups, or more specialized
in areas in which knowledge creation, dissemination and commercialization occurs. One
of the aims of the paper is to discriminate between these possibilities.
While it may appear obvious that U.S. total factor productivity benets from the
presence of creative, inventive and entrepreneurial immigrants in the United States, cer-
tain conditions must hold for this to be true. It must be the case that immigrants would
have been less innovative abroad, or would not have been able to commercialize their
2innovation as eectively abroad, or that innovation and its dissemination and commer-
cialization abroad benet Americans less than when these occur in the United States.
Kahn and MacGarvie (2008) provide evidence for the rst condition, Eaton and Kortum
(1999) for the third. It must also be the case that there is little crowd{out of native in-
novation, or that crowd{out has little eect on native contributions to productivity, due
to increased task specialization and use of comparative advantage. Hunt and Gauthier{
Loiselle (forthcoming) provide evidence that skilled immigrants have positive rather than
negative spill{overs on native inventors, while Peri and Sparber (2008) show that skilled
natives react to immigration by entering occupations with more communicative and inter-
active skill requirements, in line with their comparative advantage. Borjas (2006a) does
not nd that immigration deters natives as a whole from attending graduate school.4
My work is not the rst to assess the performance of skilled immigrants to the United
States. Immigrants have been shown to be over{represented among recent U.S.{based
Nobel Prize winners, founders of recent public venture{backed U.S. companies, founders
of large high{tech companies, members of the National Academy of Sciences and the Na-
tional Academy of Engineering, authors of highly{cited science and engineering journal
articles, founders of bio{tech companies undergoing IPOs, and international patent ap-
plications from the United States.5 Kerr (2007) documents the surge in the share of U.S.
patents awarded to U.S.{based inventors with Chinese and Indian names to 12% of the
total by 2004.
My work diers in its use of a representative sample of college graduates, with data
containing several outcomes of interest and covariates permitting an explanation of why
immigrants perform well. Furthermore, my comparison of immigrant outcomes by visa
class is unique as far as the non{wage outcomes are concerned. I build on the results of
Hunt and Gauthier{Loiselle (forthcoming), who show that college{educated immigrants
are twice as likely to patent as college{educated natives, due to their concentration in
4 Jackson (2009) examines the eect of the skill mix of immigration, but not the level of immigration,
on native college attendance.
5 Peri (2007), Anderson and Platzer (2006), Wadhwa, Saxenian et al. (2007), Stephan and Levin
(2001), Wadhwa, Jasso et al. (2007).
3science and engineering. I am motivated by considerations similar to those of Paser-
man (2008), who does not nd that skilled immigration to Israel raised manufacturing
productivity. I follow two papers in linking patenting and visa type: Kerr and Lincoln
(2008), who tie increases in H{1B visas to increased patenting by inventors with Indian
and Chinese names in cities with high H{1B visa applications; and Stuen, Mobarak and
Maskus (2007), who nd that immigrant students increase U.S. university patenting and
science and engineering publishing.6 I complement the work of Fairlie (2008), who nds
immigrants are more likely than natives to start a business with at least one employee,
an advantage they retain even when compared to natives with similar characteristics.
My analysis of wages by visa type diers from that of some previous authors in its em-
phasis on the entry visa rather than the current visa. The wages of immigrants currently
on temporary visas may be lower than the immigrants' long{run productivity after assim-
ilation to the U.S. labor market. Furthermore, the long{run contribution of immigrants is
inuenced by selective return migration: Lubotsky (2007) nds evidence that lower{paid
immigrants disproportionately leave the United States.7 By including in my analysis for-
mer holders of temporary visas, I am able to assess the longer{run potential of those who
enter on temporary visas and remain in the United States. The small number of existing
papers on entry visa type do not have a native comparison group. Using samples of new
legal permanent residents for the United States and Canada respectively, Massey and
Nalone (2002) and Sweetman and Warman (2009) nd that the highest earners are those
adjusting status from temporary worker or student. In such samples of new immigrants,
the dierences may reect time since migration.
Using the nationally representative 2003 National Survey of College Graduates (NSCG),
I nd that immigrants who rst entered the United States on a student/trainee visa or a
temporary work visa have a large advantage over natives in wages, patenting, commercial-
6 On immigration and patenting, see also Chellaraj, Maskus and Mattoo (2008), Morgan, Kruytbosch
and Kannankutty (2003) and Peri (2007).
7 Among the few concrete return migration statistics are those of Finn (2000, 2005), who shows that
about half of foreign PhD recipients are still in the United States ve years after graduating, with this
share rising over the 1990s.
4izing or licensing patents, and writing books or papers for publication and presentation
at conferences. Those who arrived on work visas and members of every sub{category of
the student/trainee group except one outperform natives on each of these measures. The
most successful immigrants arrived as post{doctoral fellows and medical residents. Immi-
grants who arrived as legal permanent residents (principally through family unication)
perform similarly to natives, while those who arrived as dependents of temporary visa
holders or on other temporary visas perform worse than natives. I conclude that rms,
universities and teaching hospitals are successful in attracting and selecting immigrants
who remain in the United States to outperform natives, thereby likely increasing U.S. to-
tal factor productivity. By contrast, natives and immigrants already in the United States
sponsor college{educated immigrant spouses and family members who perform similarly
to college{educated natives.
For non{wage outcomes, much of the work and student/trainee visa immigrant advan-
tage is explained by immigrants' higher education and eld of study. U.S. rms, univer-
sities and teaching hospitals are thus identifying innovative immigrants based mainly on
their educational qualities, rather than on superior innate creative or inventive abilities
at a given education level. However, even compared to similar natives, three of the four
student/trainee groups retain an advantage in writing books or papers for publication or
presentation. Furthermore, conditional on education, immigrants are more likely than
natives to start a company with more than ten workers, suggesting that immigrants have
a niche in start{ups based on technical knowledge from master's and doctoral degrees.
Conversely, immigrants who entered as legal permanent residents perform worse than
similar natives on all outcomes except company start{ups.
For wages, taking immigrants' higher education and more lucrative eld of study into
account does more than explain the immigrant advantage: each entry visa group earns
less than similar natives, except immigrants who arrived as college students and those
who arrived on temporary work visas, who earn the same. However, if all immigrants
had arrived in the United States as children, and had acquired U.S. education, each
immigrant group would earn the same as or more than similar natives. This suggests that
5the unobserved general ability of immigrants is similar to or greater than that of natives,
but that immigrants are handicapped by weaker language and culture{specic skills.8
Immigrants who arrived on work visas, as post{doctoral fellows and medical residents,
and as graduate students suer most from having arrived in the United States at an older
age, and, in the case of the rst two groups, with a foreign highest degree. Therefore, while
these groups might appear appealing to the United States because of the free education
they bring with them, this education does come at a price for the United States.
In order to relate my work to the literature on the performance of workers holding
H{1B visas, I also examine outcomes by current visa status: Matlo (2008) and Miano
(2007) nd that H{1B holders earn less than similar natives, while Mithas and Lucas
(2008) nd they earn more. I conrm the nding of Lowell and Avato (2007), who study
science and engineering occupations in the 2003 NSCG, that it is crucial to distinguish
between holders of temporary work visas for whom this was also their entry visa type
and holders of temporary work visas whose entry visa was a student/trainee visa. While
temporary work visa holders collectively earn less than similar natives, this is the net
eect of a conditional wage advantage for the former group, and a larger conditional
wage disadvantage for the latter group. The results underscore the insights gained from
classifying immigrants by entry visa.
2 Background on U.S. Visas
Respondents in my data who were born abroad without U.S. citizenship are asked their
visa status when they rst came to the United States for six months or more. In this
section, I describe the most common visas for skilled immigrants, which of the general
categories on the survey they are likely to correspond to, which U.S.{based agents inuence
the selection of immigrants of each visa type, and how immigrants may remain in the
8 Previous papers have shown that age at arrival has a negative eect on wages e.g. Borjas (1995).
Bleakley and Chin (2004) show the importance of language acquisition, though Schaafsma and Sweetman
(2001) show that much of the eect in Canada reects zero returns to foreign experience and lower returns
to foreign than Canadian education. Sweetman (2003) relates eld of study and wages for immigrants to
Canada.
6United States.
The rst option on the survey is \Permanent U.S. Resident Visa (Green Card)",
which I shall henceforth refer to as a green card. This has an unambiguous mapping to
legal permanent residence, but does not distinguish between types of green card, notably
between employment{based and family{based green cards.9 One can characterize this
group as having been selected by their relatives under family unication provisions, since
most green cards are family{based, and recipients of family{based green cards are more
likely to be new arrivals than recipients of employment{based green cards.10
The second survey option is \Temporary U.S. Resident Visa for temporary work (e.g.,
H{1B, L{1A, L{1B, etc.)". H{1B visas (prior to 1991, simply H{1 visas) are for workers
in specialty occupations, dened as requiring a body of specialized knowledge and a
bachelor's degree or equivalent.11 L{1A and L{1B are visas for intra{company transferees:
the holder must have worked for the company for a year abroad, and in most cases
requires a bachelor's degree or equivalent. This second survey category would also include
Canadian and Mexicans on TN visas, who must have a job oer in the United States from
a list of occupations which in most cases require a bachelor's degree, and holders of O
visas for workers of extraordinary ability. The J{1 or exchange visitor visa, administered
by the Department of State, is an eclectic visa whose holders span au pairs to professors
to students. Some J{1 holders are likely to respond that they had a temporary work visa.
This second survey category can be characterized as one whose members are chosen among
the applicants by rms, within the government framework generally requiring applicants
to have a bachelor's degree.
The third option is \Temporary U.S. Resident Visa for study or training (e.g., F-1,
J-1, H-3, etc.)". Most students studying for a degree at a four{year college or university
obtain F{1 visas, unless they have certain types of graduate fellowship, usually foreign{
9 Information on dierent types of green card is available at
travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/types 1326.html, accessed 25 March 2009.
10 See Massey and Nalone (2002). Most college{educated winners of the diversity lottery would also
be in this category, but would be a small share of it.
11 A description of the current full set of temporary visas can be found by clicking on \non{immigrant
visas" at travel.state.gov/visa/temp/temp 1305.html, accessed 25 March 2009.
7funded, in which case they hold J{1 visas. Post{doctoral fellows and holders of foreign
medical degrees doing a medical residency in the United States in general hold J{1 visas.
There are also provisions for rms to engage trainees on J{1 or H{3 visas. A small
number of foreign students studying at U.S. high schools hold F{1 visas, while some
survey respondents may have initially entered the United States for vocational training
on an M{1 visa before going on to obtain a bachelor's degree. Holders of the visas in this
third survey category (except rm trainees) are chosen by universities and their teaching
hospitals.
The fourth option is \Temporary U.S. Resident Visa as the dependent of another
person (e.g., F-2, H-4, J-2, K-2, L-2, etc.)". These dependents are a mix of spouses and
children of principal temporary visa holders (a K{2 holder is the minor child of a K{1
holder, who in turn is the anc e(e) of a U.S. citizen). While spouses of J{1 and L visa
holders may work, spouses of H{1 and F{1 visa holders may not . Holders of these visas
are chosen by their spouses, or by genetics.
The nal option is \Other Temporary U.S. Resident Visa". Given the myriad of
possible visas, it is hard to judge what the most common type is likely to be in this
category, though it would include E visa holders (treaty traders and investors).
In order to stay permanently in the United States, an immigrant must obtain legal
permanent residence (unless he or she renews TN visas yearly forever). Holders of F{
1 student visas may not apply for employment{based green cards, but may apply for
temporary work visas (and may work for a year as \practical training"). Holders of J{1
visas may in principle not apply for green cards, and are often bound to return to their
home country. H{1B visas last three years and can be renewed once (prior to 1991, H{1
visas could be used for ve years); the transition to an employer{sponsored green card
has been ocially sanctioned since 1991, as is the case for L visa holders. However, as
of 2006, the number of pending applications for adjustment to employment{based green
cards was nine times the annual quota available (Wadhwa, Jasso et al. 2007).12 Those
12 See waiting times in the Visa Bulletins at travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin 1770.html,
accessed 25 March 2009.
8waiting for green cards are bound by the terms of their temporary visa, which include
a prohibition on changing employers and on spousal employment for H{1B holders, and
on starting a company for all temporary visa holders except treaty investors and L{1
visa holders setting up a subsidiary. However, many skilled immigrants on temporary
visas, including student visas, obtain permanent residence through their marriage to a
U.S. citizen, as numerically unlimited green cards for spouses of U.S. citizens are much
faster and easier to obtain than employment{based green cards.13
3 Data and descriptive statistics
I use the 2003 wave of the National Survey of College Graduates (NSCG), data collected
under the auspices of the National Science Foundation. The survey is a stratied random
sample of respondents to the 2000 census long form who reported having a bachelor's
degree or higher. The survey has the advantages of a large sample size, and information
on patenting, publishing and starting companies; the eld of study of the highest degree;
the type of entry visa for immigrants (described in the previous section); immigrants'
current visa; and whether each degree was received in the United States (which allows me
to sub{divide the student/trainee entry visa category).
Immigrants arriving between April 2000 and October 2003 are not in the sampling
frame, and obversely, all immigrants in the data have been in the United States at least
three years.14 The sampling frame should capture the vast majority of immigrants still
in the United States who entered on a temporary work visa (for which a college degree is
generally required) or on a student visa (except those who entered for college and dropped
out or who entered for high school and did not complete college), but captures only a
subset of those who entered on green cards and or as dependents of temporary work visa
holders: those who had college degrees by the time of the survey.
13 See Jasso, Rosenzweig and Smith (2000), who emphasize immigrant adaptability to changing visa
options, and Wadhwa, Jasso et al. (2007).
14 Picot and Hou (2009) nd that the earnings of newly{arrived skilled immigrants in Canada were
depressed from 2000{2004 by the IT bust. Their American counterparts are not in the sampling frame
of the NSCG.
9All respondents who have ever worked are asked a series of questions concerning the
ve{year window since October 1998: how many distinct papers they had (co{)authored
for presentation at regional, national or international conferences; how many papers they
had (co{)authored had been accepted for publication in refereed professional journals; how
many books or monographs they had (co{)authored had been accepted for publication;
how many U.S. patent applications they had made; how many U.S. patents had been
granted; how many granted patents had resulted in commercialized products or processes
or had been licensed.
Questions asked of all respondents currently working allow me to construct a dummy
variable for whether the respondent had in the last ve years founded a company that
currently has more than ten employees. I would prefer to capture companies with at least
one employee, but I must rely on the rm size variable whose smallest category is ten or
fewer employees. I construct hourly wages from salary, weeks and hours on the principal
job.
I use three samples in my analysis. The rst contains all those who have ever worked,
which is the group answering the publishing and patenting questions. The second contains
those currently working, for the analysis of start{ups. The third contains those currently
working who do not have implausible wage values, for the analysis of wages. I keep the
latter two samples separate, as I do not wish to exclude observations with implausible
wages from the start{up analysis, as company founders may be particularly likely to report
odd salaries. I retain in all samples those indicating being self{employed on their principal
job. I include in my samples respondents 64 or younger (the youngest respondent is 23,
but few are younger than 26). The Data Appendix gives more details on the data and
sample construction.
Table 1 shows how the three (weighted) samples are distributed by nativity and entry
visa. The samples sizes range from 75,940 for the wage sample (column 1) to 90,293 for
the patent and publication sample (columns 3 and 4). Column 3 shows that 5.2% of the
latter sample are immigrants who arrived with green cards, and this group represents
43% of immigrants (column 4). 12% of immigrants arrived on temporary work visas, 24%
10on student/trainee visas, 12% as dependents of temporary visa holders, and 9% on other
temporary visas.
I split the student/trainee visa group into those who came to the United States to
do a bachelor's degree (after high school completion abroad), those who came to do a
graduate degree of any kind (having obtained a bachelor's degree abroad), those who came
after having completed either a doctorate or a professional degree abroad (post{doctoral
research fellows or medical residents or fellows, see below), and a residual \other" group,
whose members arrived either for pre{bachelor study or as rm trainees. The largest
group of student/trainee visa entrants consists of those who arrived in the United States
for graduate school (column 3).
Table 2 shows the means of the dependent variables I shall consider, by nativity
and entry visa. Panel A show that the immigrants have higher wages than natives,
and are more likely to have started a rm, been granted a patent, commercialized or
licensed a patent, and have authored any publication or paper for conference presentation
(columns 1{5). These dierences are all statistically signicant except for the case of
start{ups in column 2. The kernel density plot in Figure 1's upper left panel shows that
immigrant and native wages are distributed very similarly, so I do not extend my wage
analysis beyond mean regression. For patents and publications, the intensive margin may
matter in addition to the extensive margin. Figure 1 suggests that this is particularly the
case for of publications (lower right panel), so I also consider dierences in the probability
of frequent publishing. I choose six publications or papers as the threshold for frequent
publishing as there is a sharp fall in the share of people with seven rather than ve or
six.15 Table 2 column 6 shows this outcome has the largest immigrant{native gap: the
immigrant propensity is double the native propensity.16 Panel B of Table 2 shows the
means of the outcomes by detailed entry visa (in the results section, I use graphs to display
these means more clearly).
15 Among those with any publications or papers, 6% have ve, 6% six, and 2.7% seven.
16 I have also analyzed the probability of frequent patenting, but the results as very similar to those
for the probability of any patent, so I do not present them.
11Writing books and papers is not primarily the pursuit of academics, though it is
disproportionately a pursuit of the highly educated. Only 17% of respondents with a
publication or paper are employed at a four{year college or university (this share includes
almost all currently enrolled full{time doctoral students, though a minority of currently
enrolled master's students), but 61% had a graduate degree (compared to 36% of the whole
sample). The shares rise only modestly to 32% and 71% respectively for respondents with
more than six publications or papers. However, the shares of authors of a publication
or paper who are academics do not encompass respondents who authored their research
before leaving academics.
Panel A of Table 3 shows that immigrants are much more likely than natives to have
studied computer science/mathematics (an aggregate eld dominated by computer sci-
ence), physical science and especially engineering for their highest degree. Panel B shows
that the post{doctoral group is concentrated in biological science (24.2%) and \science
and engineering{related" elds (50.4%). The latter aggregate eld is dominated by health:
these immigrants come to the United States for medical residencies or fellowships after a
medical degree abroad.
In Table 4, I present the weighted means of the education and other variables. Panel A
shows that immigrants have more of every type of post{college degree than natives, with
the gap especially large for doctoral degrees.17 Panel B shows that immigrants in every
group except those who arrived on a green card and on \other" student/trainee visas have
more education than natives, including those who arrived for college.18 The immigrants
oldest on arrival in the United States are those who arrived on work visas and as post{docs
(column 6), each group with an average age of 29.7. Column 7 shows the share of each
entry visa group with a highest degree earned in the United States. Appendix Tables 1
and 2 give the means of other covariates by entry visa. I defer statistics by current visa
until later in the paper.
17 Foreign law and medical degrees are classied as professional degrees, even though they often require
fewer years of study than in the United States, where a bachelor's degree must rst be completed.
18 Because the survey samples only college graduates, I will not observe immigrant college students
who drop out.
124 Method
All my outcomes of interest except wages are binary outcomes, so for most regressions I
estimate probits weighted with sample weights, presenting marginal eects:
P(Yi) = 0 + Ii1 + X1i2 + i; (1)
where i indexes individuals and Ii is a vector containing dummies for all the entry visa
groups, for those born abroad to American parents, and for those born in U.S. territories
(I do not present the coecients on the latter two dummies). Alternatively, immigrants
are classied by current visa. The dependent variables are the innovation and start{
up outcomes in columns 2{6 in Table 2. The X1i in whose inuence I am particularly
interested are eld of study of highest degree (30 dummies), highest degree, whether
the highest degree was earned in the United States and immigrant age at arrival in the
United States, but I also consider age, foreign and U.S. potential experience, years since
migration, arrival cohort eects, current enrollment status (three dummies), sex, race and,
for the publications and papers outcome, employment status, employment at a four{year
post{secondary institution and the interaction of education and eld. The results are
robust to including the interaction of age and eld.
For wages, I estimate a weighted least squares equivalent with robust standard errors:
log w = 0 + Ii1 + X2i2 + i; (2)
and consider the covariates in X1i from (1), along with tenure, self{employment status
and census region of residence.
Since some entry visa categories themselves are closely linked to age at arrival, I need
a smooth function of age at arrival to attempt to identify the eects separately, and I
elect to use a spline with knots at ten yearly intervals beginning at age 0, with a nal knot
at age 50. My specication allows me to identify separate eects for age at arrival, years
since migration and arrival cohort (decade of arrival), since I constrain all coecients
unrelated to immigration to be the same for immigrants and natives. It is well known
13that distinguishing such eects in a single cross{section is fraught with peril, however,
so as a check, I analyze annual salaries using the pooled 1993 and 2003 surveys (I do
not report the results). The age at arrival eects that result are very similar to those
estimated below for hourly wages in the 2003 cross{section, and, similarly to what I nd
below, have a much larger eect on the coecients on the dummies for the visa proxies I
can construct than cohort and years since migration eects.19
5 Results
I begin by outlining how immigrants fare collectively compared with natives, before consid-
ering how the various entry visa groups perform for each outcome (except rm start{ups,
where the standard errors are too large), and turning to performance by current visa
status.
5.1 Performance by nativity
In this section, I estimate simplied versions of equations (1) and (2), with only three
elements in Ii: immigrant, born outside the United States of American parents, and born
in a U.S. territory. In Table 5, I report the coecient or marginal eect on the immigrant
dummy for each outcome.
I begin with wages in Panel A. Column 1 shows that unconditionally, immigrants earn
2.9% more than natives. However, simply controlling for eld of study of highest degree is
sucient to ip the sign (column 2): immigrants earn 4.5% less than natives with a similar
eld of study. As immigrants are more educated as well as having studied more lucrative
elds, controlling for education in column 3 increases the immigrant disadvantage to 8.1%.
Controlling for gender, race and age in column 4 improves the immigrant relative standing
slightly, due to gender and race (immigrants and natives are close in age): immigrants
are much less likely to be white non{hispanics, and within eld of study, more likely to
19 The 1993 survey does not ask about entry visa (nor work hours, patenting or publishing). The proxy
visa groups I can construct are based on the educational stage at which the immigrants arrive: before
college, for college, for graduate school, and after completing all education abroad.
14be female.20 Controlling for self{employment and tenure in column 5 reduces immigrants'
disadvantage because immigrants have lower tenure. Finally, controlling for census region
in column 6 increases immigrants' disadvantage to 8.2%: immigrants live disproportion-
ately in high{wage regions. Controlling for region may lead the immigrants' disadvantage
to be overstated, as it may pick up genuine regional productivity dierences of college
graduates, and not merely price levels: college graduates in California, for example, may
genuinely be more productive than college graduates elsewhere.
In Panel B, I examine the probability of having a patent granted. The unconditional
immigrant advantage is 1.1 percentage points in column 1, equal to the mean patenting
propensity of 1.1%. However, 90% of the advantage is explained by eld of study (col-
umn 2). By comparison, the covariates added in the subsequent columns have little eect
on the gap, which becomes small and statistically insignicant. The results for having
commercialized or licensed a patent are similar in Panel C: the unconditional immigrant
advantage of 0.7 percentage points is equal to the mean propensity (column 1), but the
advantage is almost entirely explained by eld of study (column 2).
In Panel D, I turn to the probability of having published book or paper or written a
paper presented at a major conference. The immigrant advantage of 3.2 percentage points
is modest compared with the mean of 14.8% (column 1). Half the advantage is explained
by eld of study (column 2), and after controlling for education, immigrants have a
statistically signicant disadvantage of 1.6 percentage points (column 3). The covariates
added in subsequent columns have little impact on the gap. The results for the probability
of publishing a lot (more than six publications and papers) in Panel E are somewhat
dierent. The immigrant advantage of 3.1 percentage points is high compared to the mean
of 4.0%, and while one third of the advantage is explained by eld of study (column 2), and
most of the rest by education (column 3), immigrants do retain a statistically signicant
though small advantage of 0.3{0.4 percentage points with more covariates.
20 Order matters here: unconditionally, immigrants are more male than natives, so gender has a big
eect reducing immigrants' advantage if controlled for rst. However, the gender eect is really a eld
of study eect.
15Because it is rare for a start{up to reach an employment level of ten workers within
ve years, the standard errors are large in the examination of start{ups in Panel F. The
unconditional immigrant advantage of 0.18 percentage points (column 1) is one third of
the mean of 0.6%, but the estimate is signicant only at the 10% level. The point estimate
falls when eld of study is added in column 2, but rises to a statistically signicant 0.18
percentage points in column 3 when education is added: immigrants found a considerable
number of rms despite their large share with master's and doctoral degrees, which are
unusual qualications for rm founders. This suggests a niche for immigrants in founding
rms using specialized academic knowledge.21 Unreported regressions indicate that hold-
ing a U.S. highest degree has no eect on starting companies and that similar Asian and
European immigrants start companies at similar rates.
5.2 Wages by entry visa
The point estimates on the entry visa dummies and their 95% condence intervals from
the key wage regressions are displayed in Figure 2 (see also Appendix Table 3). The top
graph in the gure shows that the unconditional wages of those who arrived on work and
student/trainee visas are high compared to those of natives. Members of the best{paid
group, immigrants who arrived as post{docs, earn fully 30 log points more, while only
members of the \other" student/trainee group do not earn more than natives. The wages
of immigrants who arrived with green cards are similar to native wages, while those who
arrived as dependents or on other temporary visas earn less than natives.
The second graph displays the results of a regression to which I add controls for eld of
study of highest degree. The eect is to shift all immigrant groups to the left: all groups
have more lucrative elds of study than natives, which explains about 8{10 log points of
each group's unconditional advantage.
The third graph displays the results of a regression containing controls for highest
21 Master's degrees include MBAs, but only 14.2% of immigrants who arrived as graduate students
have management and administration as the eld of study for their highest degree, compared with 19.0%
for natives.
16degree. Only those who arrived on work visas and for college do not have statistically
signicantly lower wages than natives conditional on eld and education: those who
arrived on work visas have a 3.5% advantage signicant at the 10% level. Allowing the
coecients on the non{visa covariates to vary according to whether the respondent is an
immigrant or not has little eect on the relative standing of the entry visa groups (these
results are not shown).
Adding further controls to the regression underlying the third graph as in Table 5
generally changes the gap for each immigrant group in qualitatively the same way as
was the case for immigrants collectively in Table 5. The most successful immigrants
remain those who arrived on work visas, with an insignicant 2.6% wage advantage (see
Appendix Table 3 column 6). If I further add dummies for 34 occupations, 7 rm sizes,
and 6 rm types (university, public, private for{prot etc.), those who arrived on work
visas have an insignicant 0.6% wage advantage over natives (this result is not reported).
I have repeated all the regressions using only full{time, full{year workers, or alternatively,
excluding the self{employed. These unreported results are very similar.
In the bottom graph of Figure 2, I instead add to the controls of the third graph a
cubic in age, a dummy for whether the respondent's highest degree was received at a U.S.
institution, the spline for age at arrival in the United States, and controls for potential
U.S. and foreign experience (a dummy for having any, and a linear term). Holding a U.S.
highest degree, age at arrival and having any foreign experience are strongly correlated,
so controlling for one without the others gives misleading results. The graph shows that,
had immigrants and natives received their highest degree in the same country, and had
immigrants arrived shortly after birth (with no foreign experience) and acquired the same
U.S. experience as natives, immigrants of all entry visas would have earned the same as
or more than similar natives. The biggest coecient increases between the third and
fourth graphs are for those who arrived on work visas and as post{docs, since they came
to the United States at a relatively old age, and, in the case of the post{docs, with a
foreign highest degree (the experience variables are less inuential and age has almost
no eect on the visa group rankings.). The fourth graph shows an enormous 36 log
17point wage advantage over natives for those who arrived on work visas, and a 18 log
point advantage for those who arrived as post{docs. The coecient of those who arrived
as college students is relatively little aected by the additional controls, indicating that
their high unconditional wages are due to their relatively young age at arrival and their
almost universally having earned their highest degree in the United States.22
The results of Figure 2 suggest that immigrants have ability similar to or higher than
natives, but are handicapped by language and other culture{specic skills. However, the
counterfactual of admitting particular entry visa groups to the United States at a young
age has no practical implications, as in most cases they could only have been selected in
the way they were at an older age.
In an unreported regression, I add a cubic in years since migration, and dummies
for arrival decade and birth region to the covariates underlying the bottom graph. This
has little eect on the point estimates of the gaps between the entry visa groups, and as
only the birth region coecients are jointly signicant, the standard errors grow large.
The magnitudes of the birth region eects are substantial compared to the immigrant
disadvantages in the third graph: immigrants born in Asia (50% of immigrants) earn
6.4% less than immigrants born in Europe (22% of immigrants), and immigrants from
regions other than Asia, North America (essentially Canada) and Oceania (essentially
Australia and New Zealand) earn 9{18% less than Europeans. This heterogeneity by birth
place could reect dierences in immigrant education quality (either abroad or within the
United States), the relevance of foreign experience for the U.S. labor market, or other
unobserved characteristics possibly inuenced by dierent self{selection mechanisms for
immigrants from dierent countries.
22 In a sample of workers of all education levels, Akee and Yuksel (2008) nd the return to years of
foreign education to be similar to the return to years of U.S. education, but nd a lower return to foreign
than U.S. experience.
185.3 Patents granted, commercialized or licensed, by entry visa
In Figure 3, I display marginal eects from probits for the probability of being granted a
patent (see also Appendix Table 4). The unconditional results in the top graph show that
those who arrived as post{docs or graduate students have an enormous 5.3{6.6 percentage
point advantage over natives, compared to a mean patenting propensity of only 1.1%.
Those who arrived on work visas or for college or on \other" student/trainee visas also
have considerable advantages over natives of 1.3{2.2%.
However, the second graph indicates that these advantages are largely explained by
eld of study. Those who arrived as post{docs and graduate students retain a statistically
signicant advantage over natives with the same eld of study, but the third graph shows
that this is attributable to their higher education. No immigrant group is more likely
to be granted a patent than natives with the same degree and eld of study, and those
who arrived as green card holders, on dependent and other temporary visas have lower
patenting propensities than natives. Allowing interactions of the non{visa covariates with
a dummy for immigrant has little eect on the ranking of the immigrant groups (these
results are not reported).
In the regression underlying the bottom graph, I control for age, age at arrival, U.S.
highest degree and foreign and U.S. experience. These controls do not have the large eects
on the rankings of immigrant groups they had in the case of wages, and the standard errors
become very large, as the age at arrival coecients (jointly) and the coecient on holding
a U.S. highest degree are statistically insignicant. In an unreported regression, I control
for years since migration, arrival cohort and birth region, which increases the standard
errors still further, again without changing much the ordering of the visa groups. As
was the case for wages, the immigrants' birth region does an important eect on their
probability of patenting: Asian immigrants are a statistically signicant 0.2 percentage
points less likely to patent than European immigrants.
I repeat the main regressions for the probability of commercializing or licensing a
patent, and display the results in Figure 4 (see also Appendix Table 5). The qualitative
19patterns are the same as for the probability of being granted a patent, though the mag-
nitudes of the marginal eects are smaller, commensurate with the smaller mean of the
outcome (0.7%).
5.4 Publications and papers by entry visa
In Figure 5, I present the marginal eects from probits for the probability of publishing
a book or paper or writing a paper presented at a conference (see also Appendix Ta-
ble 6). The top graph shows the enormous unconditional advantages over natives enjoyed
by immigrants who arrived as post{docs (53 log points) and immigrants who arrived as
graduate students (27 log points), compared to the mean propensity of 14.8%. The mem-
bers of these two immigrant groups by denition had research as a major activity when
they arrived in the United States, so this is not a surprise. More interestingly, immigrants
who arrived on work visas, for college or for other study or training also have statistically
signicant advantages over natives of approximately 5 percentage points. Immigrants
who arrived with a green card perform worse than natives, while the dependent and other
temporary visa categories are statistically indistinguishable from natives.
In the second graph, I display the results of the regression controlling for eld of study.
This control does not explain much of the rst graph's gaps between groups. By contrast,
the higher education of the student/trainee and work visa groups explains most of their
publication advantage over natives, as shown in the third graph. Three groups are left
with a higher publication propensity than natives: immigrants who arrived for graduate
school, for other study or training, or as post{docs. The publishing advantage of the latter
group is equal to the mean at 14 log points. Appendix Table 6 columns 4 and 5 show
that much of the advantage of the graduate school and \other" student/trainee groups is
explained by current enrollment and employment at a four{year college or university, while
most of the advantage of the post{docs remains after these controls. Adding controls for
highest degree interacted with eld leaves the gaps between groups similar (these results
are not reported). Both unconditional and conditional results are qualitatively similar if
20the sample is restricted to PhDs or employees of four{year colleges or universities.
In Figure 6, I examine the probability of having more than six publications or papers
(see also Appendix Table 7). The results for the unconditional probability (top graph)
and the probability conditional on eld (second graph), are qualitatively the same as the
for the probability of any publication in Figure 5, though the magnitudes of the marginal
eects are somewhat smaller (the mean is considerably smaller, at 4.0%, making the gaps
between the groups larger relative to the mean). However, after controls for eld of study
and highest degree, in the bottom graph, immigrants who arrived on work visas, as post{
docs, as graduate students and as other students/trainees retain statistically signicant
advantages over natives of 1.3{7.0 percentage points. These advantages are not explained
by student status or employment at a university (see Appendix Table 7 columns 4 and
5), nor by the interaction of eld and highest degree (these results are not reported).
In the regression underlying the bottom graph of Figure 6, I add controls for age, U.S.
highest degree, age at arrival, and foreign and U.S. experience to the regression underlying
the third graph. The main eect is to increase the standard errors. This is also the main
eect of controlling for years since migration, arrival cohort and birth region (these results
are not reported); Asian immigrants are a statistically signicant 1.7 percentage points
less likely to publish frequently than similar European immigrants.
5.5 Performance by current visa status
I now turn to analyzing performance by current, rather than entry, visa status. In Ta-
ble 6 Panel A, I show how the sample is divided by current visa status. A majority of
immigrants are naturalized U.S. citizens, and most immigrants are either naturalized or
have green cards. The samples of dependents of temporary visa holders and holders of
other temporary visas are small, as is the sample of working students, and I present little
further information on them. Panel B shows that most current work visa holders either
entered the United States on a work visa (42%) or on a student/trainee visa (46%). I
focus my remarks on holders of student/trainee and work visas, since it is not clear how
21or which green card holders choose to naturalize.23
Column 2 of Table 6 shows that the highest{earning visa group is work visa holders
who entered the United States as such (\new work visa holders"). Naturalized citizens
also earn more than natives, while work visa holders who entered as students/trainees
(\U.S.{educated work visa holders") earn about the same as natives. I also show the
shares of each current visa group which patent and which publish frequently, but these
means are more easily seen in the graphs below.
In Table 7, I provide selected means for the main current visa categories, which high-
light large dierences between the two main work visa categories. While 65% of new work
visa holders have only a bachelor's degree (column 1), the same share as natives, only
17% of the U.S.{educated work visa holders had only a bachelor's degree, making them
the most educated group. The U.S.{educated work visa holders are more likely to have
studied biological sciences compared to engineering (columns 2 and 3), and if working,
are very likely to work at a four{year college or university: column 6 shows that 25% do
so. Columns 4 and 5 show that, as expected, holders of temporary visas are younger and
have been in the United States fewer years than green card holders or naturalized citizens
(or natives, in the case of age).
I analyze the determinants of wages by current visa in Table 8, presenting the coe-
cients only on the visa categories of most interest. Columns 1 and 2 show that while work
visa holders collectively earn 6.0% more than natives, they are at a 6.9% disadvantage
once education, eld of study and age are taken into account. In the remaining columns I
split the work visa holders into their constituent groups. Unconditionally, new work visa
holders earn fully 18.2% more than natives, while U.S.{educated work visa holders earn
an insignicant 2.8% more (column 3). Controlling for eld of study has a large eect in
column 4, reducing the new work visa advantage to 4.7%, and turning the U.S.{educated
work visa advantage into an 8.9% disadvantage. Controlling for education in column 5 has
little eect on the new work visa advantage, as this group has similar education to natives,
23 I therefore do not analyze rm start{ups as most temporary visa holders are not permitted to own
companies. I cannot subdivide the current student/trainee group for reasons of sample size.
22but has a large eect on the highly{educated U.S.{educated work visa group, increasing
the disadvantage to 24.9%. However, immigrants on temporary visas are younger than
natives, so in column 6, where I introduce controls for age, the new work visa advantage
rises to 8.5% and the U.S.{educated work visa disadvantage shrinks to 15.1%.
I follow the existing literature by controlling successively for more covariates in columns
7{9, which reduces the new work visa coecient somewhat without having much eect on
the U.S.{educated work visa coecient. In column 9, where I control for demographics,
enrollment status, tenure, self{employment, region, occupation and rm characteristics
(including working in a four{year college or university), new work visa holders maintain a
3.6% advantage over natives (albeit now statistically insignicant), while U.S.{educated
work visa holders languish at a 13.2% disadvantage compared to natives. This is consis-
tent with the results of Figure 2, which showed that those who entered on a work visa had
the highest conditional wages of any entry visa group, equal to conditional native wages,
despite their relatively old age upon arrival in the United States and their foreign educa-
tion. It is thus not necessary to appeal to rapid assimilation or to selective emigration to
explain the later success of those initially on temporary visas: they are high earners from
the time of their arrival.
Finally, in column 10, I control for age at arrival, U.S. highest degree and U.S. and
foreign experience. Consistent with Figure 2, new work visa holder wages are much
higher (22.7 log points) than native wages when adjusted to reect arrival shortly after
birth and a U.S. highest degree. For U.S.{educated work visa holders, while half the wage
disadvantage is explained and the coecient becomes insignicant, the point estimate
remains negative, unlike the corresponding case in Figure 2. The results of an unreported
regression where I also control for arrival cohort, years since migration and birth region
does not aect the ordering of the visa groups, but indicates that Asian immigrants earn
7.3% less than European immigrants.
In Figure 7, I present results for the probability of patenting. The two main work visa
groups have statistically indistinguishable positive coecients, statistically signicant in
one case, only slightly lower than the mean patenting propensity of 1.1%. After I control
23for eld of study, in the middle graph, and education, in the bottom graph, both main
work visa groups and student/trainee visa holders have statistically signicantly lower
patenting probabilities than natives, and the three groups are not statistically signicantly
dierent from each other. Unlike in the case of wages, for patenting the addition of age
controls does not aect the relative standing of the visa groups, so I do not present these
results.
In Figure 8, I perform the same exercise for the probability of frequent publishing,
whose mean is 4.0%. Students and U.S.{educated work visa holders are an enormous
22{28 percentage points more likely to publish frequently than natives, while even the
statistically signicantly smaller advantage of new work visa holders, at 6.4 percentage
points, is still large (top graph). These advantages are reduced by controls for eld of study
(middle graph) and education (bottom graph), but students retain a 15.3 percentage point
advantage over natives, and the two main work visa groups retain a 4.1{4.3 percentage
point advantage, though this is signicant only for the U.S.{educated work visa holders.
As in the case of patents, controlling for age changes the results little, and I do not present
these results.
Table 6 and Figures 7 and 8 have shown that while it is essential to distinguish new and
U.S.{educated work visa holders for the purposes of wages, the distinction is much less
important for patenting and frequent publishing. Both groups have a higher unconditional
patenting propensity than natives, which is consistent with the entry visa results (high
standard errors preclude comparing the few current students/trainees with those who
entered on a student/trainee visa). Conditional on eld of study and education, current
students/trainees and both current work visa groups patent less than natives, whereas by
entry visa, students/trainees and work visa holders were indistinguishable from natives
(c.f. Figures 3 and 7). I can control for years since migration to assess whether those
currently on work visas will catch up to natives once they have been in the United States as
long as those who entered on work visas. This does not appear to be the case (these results
are not reported), but questions of assimilation, cohort eects and selective emigration are
not well dealt with in a single cross{section. Both current work visa groups and current
24students/trainees are more likely to publish frequently than natives, both conditionally
and unconditionally. This is qualitatively consistent with the results by entry visa (c.f.
Figures 6 and 8), though current students/trainees publish even more relative to natives
than do former students (those who entered on a student/trainee visa).
6 Conclusions
Using the 2003 National Survey of College Graduates, I show that immigrants who orig-
inally entered the United States on temporary work visas or on student/trainee visas
outperform native college graduates in wages, patenting, commercializing and licensing
patents and authoring books or papers for publication or presentation at major confer-
ences. I also nd that, conditional on education, these immigrants are more likely than
natives to start a successful company, suggesting that immigrants have a niche in start{
ups based on technical knowledge from master's and doctoral degrees. Immigrants who
arrived as legal permanent residents (principally through family unication) perform sim-
ilarly to natives, while those who arrived as dependents of temporary visa{holders or
on other temporary visas perform worse than natives. The results suggest a ranking of
the gross contribution of immigrant groups according to their status on arrival in the
United States: postdoctoral fellows and medical residents; graduate students; temporary
work visa holders; college students; other students/trainees; legal permanent residents;
dependents of temporary visa holders; and other temporary visa holders.
The success of skilled immigrants is determined by a combination of immigrant self{
selection in wanting to come to the United States, the entry visa framework provided by
the government, the behavior of U.S.{based agents who select immigrants applying for
particular visas, immigrant self{selection in wanting to remain in the United States, and
the visa framework for remaining. I conclude that within this complex system, rms,
universities and teaching hospitals are the most successful in attracting and selecting
immigrants engaged in activities likely to increase U.S. total factor productivity. By
contrast, natives and immigrants already in the United States sponsor college{educated
25immigrant spouses and family members who perform similarly to college{educated natives.
For most outcomes and entry visa groups, the work and student/trainee visa immi-
grant advantage is explained by immigrants' higher education and eld of study. U.S.
rms, universities and teaching hospitals are thus identifying high{quality immigrants
based mainly on their educational credentials, rather than on superior innate creative or
inventive abilities among those at a given education level. However, even compared to
similar natives, three of the four student/trainee groups retain an advantage in authoring
books or papers for publication or presentation at major conferences. Also, although im-
migrants who arrived as college students perform similarly on all outcomes to similarly
educated natives, universities do identify immigrant college students who, if they stay in
the United States, eventually obtain more education than native college students. Com-
pared to similar natives, immigrants who entered as legal permanent residents perform
worse on all outcomes except company start{ups. I identify considerable dierences by
country of origin, with immigrants from Europe performing better than similar immi-
grants from Asia for all outcomes except rm start{ups.
One element of a cost{benet analysis of the net contribution of each immigrant
group to natives is savings to the United States from immigrant education completed and
nanced abroad. However, I show that this foreign education does come at a price to the
United States: foreign education commands a lower wage return in the U.S. labor market,
and the more foreign education an immigrant has, the older he or she is upon arrival in
the United States, which further reduces wages and productivity. Only immigrants who
arrived as college students (due to their young age at arrival and U.S. degrees) and
immigrants who arrived on temporary work visas earn as much as similar natives. All
entry visa groups would earn the same as or more than similar natives had they arrived
as children and acquired U.S. degrees. Conversely, holding a foreign highest degree has
no impact on non{wage outcomes, and age at arrival has a weaker inuence on these
outcomes than on wages.
In my analysis of outcomes by current visa status, I conrm the crucial nature of the
distinction made by Lowell and Avato (2007), between temporary work visa holders who
26entered the United States as such, and those who entered on student/trainee visas. The
former group out{earns natives both conditionally and unconditionally, while the latter
highly{educated group has unconditional wages similar to natives', but earns much less
than natives conditional on education. These results underscore the insights gained by
classifying immigrants according to entry visa.
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30Data Appendix
I use individual{level data from the 2003 National Survey of College Graduates (NSCG).
The data may be downloaded at sestat.nsf.gov/datadownload/. The survey is a stratied
random sample of respondents to the 2000 census long form who reported having a bach-
elor's degree or higher. Immigrants arriving between April 2000 and October 2003 are
not in the sampling frame. I drop respondents who live outside the United States or in
U.S. territories, or who are aged 65 or older (the youngest respondent is 23, but few are
younger than 26). I include in all samples those who are self{employed on their principal
job.
My wage sample is based on respondents working at the time of the survey. I do
not make any exclusions based on hours worked. The survey asks for \basic annual
salary" on the principal job, and instructs \Do not include bonuses, overtime or additional
compensation for summertime teaching or research". The self{employed are directed to
\estimate earned income, excluding business expenses". There are no negative salary
values. I compute hourly wages by dividing the annual salary by the number of weeks
it was based on and by the usual weekly hours on this job. I drop 1636 observations
with missing or zero wage values and observations with hourly wage values below $5.15,
the federal minimum wage in 2003 (1457 observations). I also drop observations with a
high hourly wage for respondents who looked likely to have confused annual weeks and
months, or weekly and daily hours (the heaping patterns suggest such confusion exists):
I drop observations with hourly wages of more than $100 if weekly hours are nine or less
or annual weeks are twelve or less (739 observations). I cannot drop observations with
imputed values, as these are not agged. However, I drop from the wage sample the 379
remaining observations with an annual salary of $565,172, a value I strongly suspect of
being imputed (the next largest annual salary is $360,000). These wage{based sample
restrictions account for the dierence in size between the wage sample (75,940) and the
rm start{up sample (80,151). In my robustness check using full{time, full{year workers,
I use workers with 50{52 weeks per year and 35 hours per week or more. The sample
for patenting and for authoring books or papers is based on respondents who had ever
worked, and has 90,293 observations.
The publishing and patenting sample is based on respondents who have ever worked.
This is the vast majority of respondents: between 0 and 1.5% of immigrants in the various
visa classes had never worked, with the exception of the \other" student category (2.7%)
and the dependents of temporary visa holders category (4.2%); this compares to 0.1% for
natives.
I dene a respondent as having founded a company if he or she responded that his
or her principal employer came into being as a new business within the past ve years,
that his or her principal employer was self{employed in the survey week (incorporated or
not), and that counting all locations where this employer operated, it had more than ten
employees. I compute potential U.S. experience as years since the award of the highest
degree if the degree was obtained in the United States or by a non{immigrant, or as
years in the United States if the highest degree was obtained abroad by an immigrant. I
31compute potential foreign experience as the dierence between the year of arrival in the
United States and the year of the award of highest degree for immigrants receiving their
highest degree abroad, zero for others. The computation resulted in a small number of
immigrants with negative potential foreign experience: I set these values to zero.
To assess whether in the census too immigrants out{earn natives among college grad-
uates, I use weighted individual data from the 2000 census. As in the NSCG, I separate
respondents born abroad of American parents and in U.S. territories from the immigrant
and native categories. I restrict the sample to ages 25{64 and compute hourly wages both
based on wage and salary income in 1999 and on all earned income in 1999. The census
does not separate either income or hours by job. Immigrants and natives in the census
earn the same hourly wages based on all earned income, but immigrants earn 1% more
when immigrants who have been in the United States less than three years are dropped.
Immigrants have 2% higher hourly wages based on wage and salary income with recent
immigrants excluded. This is a smaller advantage than the 4{5% advantage calculated
in the NSCG for either all workers or workers without the self{employed (the log wage





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40Table 1: Shares of natives and immigrants by entry visa 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




Patent and publication sample  
(%) 
U.S. native  86.3  85.9  86.4  -- 
Born American abroad  1.2  1.6  1.1  -- 
Born in U.S. territories  0.3  0.3  0.3  -- 
Green card  5.2  5.2  5.2  43.1 
Work, temporary  1.6  1.5  1.5  12.0 
Study/training, temporary      24.3 
    - for college  0.9  0.9  0.9  -- 
    - for graduate school  1.3  1.2  1.2  -- 
    - for post-doc  0.3  0.3  0.3  -- 
    - for other  0.7  0.7  0.7  -- 
Dependent, temporary  1.3  1.3  1.4  11.6 
Other temporary  1.1  1.1  1.1  9.0 
  100  100  100  100 
Observations  75,940  80,151  90,293 
 
Notes: Shares weighted with survey weights. The wage and start-up samples include those working 
in the survey reference week. The patent and publication sample includes those who have ever 
worked.  Patents,  publications  and  start-ups  are  for  the  five  years  prior  to  the  survey  week. 
Publications include published books or journal articles or papers authored for regional, national or 
international conference presentations.  
 Table 2: Weighted means of outcomes by entry visa 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 






with more than 
ten workers (%) 
Granted  Commer-
cialized 
Any  More 
than six 
A. Immigrant vs native             
U.S. native  29.6  0.6  0.9  0.6  14.4  3.6 
Immigrant   30.7  0.8  2.0  1.3  17.6  6.8 
B.  Entry visa type             
Green card  29.7  0.6  1.0  0.6  11.0  2.9 
Work  34.2  1.0  3.0  2.0  18.3  7.6 
Dependent  27.9  0.8  0.8  0.6  14.5  4.2 
Other temporary  26.0  0.4  1.1  0.7  12.6  4.3 
Study/training             
    - for college  32.4  1.1  2.9  1.9  18.5  6.1 
    - for graduate school  35.1  1.0  6.1  3.4  41.5  20.1 
     - for post-doc  40.4  0.7  7.2  3.6  67.0  45.8 
    - for other  29.6  1.5  2.1  1.7  21.4  7.7 
Observations  75,940  80,151  90,293 
 
Notes: Means weighted with survey weights. Publications include published books or journal articles 
or  papers  authored  for  regional,  national  or  international  conference  presentations.  Means  for 
Americans born abroad and individuals born in U.S. territories are not reported. 
 Table 3: Weighted means of field of study of highest degree by entry visa (%) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 














A. Immigrant vs native             
U.S. native  3.6  4.0  1.7  10.8  5.3  12.2  62.4 
Immigrant   8.5  5.5  3.7  9.1  14.4  16.8  41.9 
B.  Entry visa type               
Green card  5.5  4.3  3.2  9.4  11.8  18.1  47.7 
Work  13.8  3.2  3.7  7.0  21.9  18.8  31.7 
Dependent  9.0  6.6  2.7  13.0  8.3  14.7  45.7 
Other temporary  6.8  4.9  3.3  10.0  12.2  16.2  46.5 
Study/training               
    - for college  9.8  4.7  2.2  7.3  18.8  12.0  45.1 
    - for grad school  16.8  9.7  6.8  6.2  25.1  8.7  26.8 
    - for post-doc  3.7  24.2  11.6  1.3  3.6  50.4  5.1 
    - for other  6.9  6.5  4.9  11.8  14.2  15.8  39.8 
 
Notes:  Means  of  patenting  and  publishing  sample,  90,293  observations,  weighted  with  survey 
weights. The rows sum to 100.  “S&E” means science and engineering. S&E related is principally 
health. Means for Americans born abroad and individuals born in U.S. territories are not reported. 
 Table 4: Weighted means of other covariates by entry visa (%, except ages) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 








A. Immigrant vs native             
U.S. native  65.0  26.0  2.9  6.2  44.4  --  99.6 
Immigrant   56.5  28.6  7.7  7.2  43.3  23.3  55.5 
B.  Entry visa type               
Green card  67.1  22.5  2.7  7.7  44.2  21.0  56.9 
Work  61.6  28.6  6.0  3.8  42.0  29.7  17.6 
Dependent  60.4  27.3  4.8  7.4  40.8  18.0  60.4 
Other temporary  62.8  25.2  3.8  8.3  44.8  27.4  35.7 
Study/training               
    - for college  53.2  34.6  7.7  4.6  42.9  21.5  97.9 
    - for grad school  0  63.7  33.2  3.1  42.3  26.0  100.0 
    - for post-doc  0  0  51.0  49.0  46.2  29.7  0.0 
    - for other  68.5  26.4  2.3  2.9  42.6  23.4  37.6 
 
Notes:  Means  of  patenting  and  publishing  sample,  90,293  observations,  weighted  with  survey 
weights. Master’s degrees include MBAs. Means for Americans born abroad and individuals born in 
U.S. territories are not reported. 
 Table 5: Nativity differences in hourly wages, patents, publications, start-ups 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
A. Log wages (75,940 obs) 












R-squared  0.00  0.07  0.13  0.17  0.19  0.21 
B. Any patent granted (90,293 obs; mean=1.1%) 











R-squared  0.01  0.15  0.19  0.22  0.22  -- 
C. Any patent licensed or commercialized (90,293 obs; mean=0.7%) 











R-squared  0.01  0.15  0.18  0.20  0.2  -- 
D. Any publication or paper (90,293 obs; mean=14.8%) 











R-squared  0.00  0.03  0.11  0.12  0.14  -- 
E. More than six publications or papers (90,293 obs; mean=4.0%) 











R-squared  0.01  0.04  0.18  0.19  0.22  -- 
F. Any start-up (80,151 obs; mean=0.6%) 











R-squared  0.00  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03  -- 
Field highest degree  --  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Highest degree  --  --  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sex, age, race  --  --  --  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Currently enrolled  --  --  --  --  Yes  Yes 
Tenure,  
self-employed 
--  --  --  --  Yes (A)  Yes (A) 
Working, working 
at university 
--  --  --  --  Yes (D)  -- 
Region  --  --  --  --  --  Yes (A) 
 
Notes: Coefficients from least squares regressions (panel A) or marginal effects from probits (panels 
B-F), weighted with survey weights. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Each coefficient 
or marginal effect is from a different regression, and in each case the omitted category is U.S. native. 
Each  regression  also  includes  dummies  for Born American  abroad  and  for  those  born  in  U.S. 
territories. Field of highest degree is controlled for with 29 dummies (28 in panels D and F), highest 
degree with dummies for master’s, doctorate and professional degrees, race with dummies for black 
non-Hispanic,  Hispanic  and  mixed-race  non-Hispanic,  age  with  a  cubic,  currently enrolled  with 
dummies for full-time master’s student, full-time doctoral student, and other student, tenure with a 
quadratic and region with 8 dummies for census region. Publications include books, journal articles 
and regional, national or international conference presentations. Table 6: Shares of natives and immigrants and means of outcomes by current visa 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 











More than six 
publications 
(%) 
Panel A           
U.S. native  86.3  29.6  86.4  0.009  0.036 
Born American abroad  1.2  29.3  1.1  0.013  0.042 
Born in U.S. territories  0.3  28.1  0.3  0.006  0.031 
Naturalized citizen  7.9  31.8  7.8  0.019  0.050 
Green card  3.3  29.0  3.3  0.026  0.078 
Work  0.8  30.6  0.7  0.015  0.161 
Study/training  0.1  17.5  0.1  0.012  0.309 
Dependent  0.0  19.7  0.1  0.004  0.010 
Other temporary  0.1  21.7  0.1  0.006  0.111 
  100.0  --  100.0  --  -- 
Panel B           
Work           
  entry visa was work  0.3  34.3  0.3  0.016  0.098 
  entry visa was study  0.4  29.0  0.3  0.018  0.250 
  entry visa was other  0.1  23.5  0.1  0.005  0.069 
Observations  75,940  90,293 
 
Notes: Statistics weighted with survey weights. The wage sample includes those working in the 
survey reference week. The patent and publication sample includes those who have ever worked. 
Patents  and  publications  are  for  the  five  years  prior  to  the  survey  week.  Publications  include 
published  books  or  journal  articles  or  papers  authored  for  regional,  national  or  international 
conference presentations. 
  Table 7: Selected covariate means by main current visa categories 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 














U.S. native  65.0  4.0  5.3  44.4  --  5.7 
Naturalized citizen  58.6  5.0  13.4  45.2  24.4  7.7 
Green card  55.9  6.0  14.9  41.0  13.5  9.2 
Study/training  28.0  13.3  17.7  31.9  6.3  78.8 
Work             
  entry visa was work  64.7  4.6  28.5  37.3  6.2  4.0 
  entry visa was study  17.3  11.1  21.4  34.0  8.6  25.4 
Observations  90,293  75,940 
 
Notes: Means of patent and publication sample (columns 1-5) or wage sample (column 6), weighted 
with survey weights. The complete set of current visa categories is given in Table 6. Table 8: Determinants of log hourly wages: current visa status 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 












































--  --  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Work visa                     
































R-squared  0.00  0.15  0.00  0.07  0.13  0.16  0.20  0.21  0.29  0.29 
Field highest degree  --  Yes  --  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Highest degree  --  Yes  --  --  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Age  --  Yes  --  --  --  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sex, race, currently enrolled, 
tenure, self-employed  
--  --  --  ---  --  --  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Occupation, firm size, firm type  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  Yes  Yes 
Age at arrival, U.S. and foreign 
experience, U.S. highest degree 
--  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  Yes 
Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions using 75,940 observations, weighted with survey weights, with log hourly wage as the dependent 
variable. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The omitted category is U.S. native. Each regression also includes dummies for 
student/trainee visa, dependent of temporary work visa holder, other temporary visa, born American abroad and those born in U.S. 
territories. Columns 3-9 also include a dummy for work visa with “other” entry visa. Field of highest degree is controlled for with 29 
dummies; highest degree with dummies for master’s, doctorate and professional degrees; race with dummies for black non-Hispanic, 
Hispanic and mixed-race non-Hispanic; age with a cubic; currently enrolled with dummies for full-time master’s student, full-time doctoral 
student, and other student; tenure with a quadratic; region with 8 dummies, occupation with 34 dummies; firm size with 7 dummies; firm 
type  with  dummies  for  four-year  university,  two-year  college,  business/industry  for  profit,  business/industry  self-employed  not-
incorporated, business/industry, non-profit, federal government, state government; age at arrival with a spline with knots every ten years to 
age 50; receipt of highest degree in U.S. with one dummy; U.S. and foreign experience each with a dummy for any and a linear term. Appendix Table 1: Weighted means of covariates entry visa (% unless specified) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 














A. Immigrant vs native               
U.S. native  50.4  88.0  0  0  16.6  8.4  16.5 
Immigrant   47.0  30.9  36.4  2.8  13.1  6.7  17.7 
B.  Entry visa type               
Green card  51.9  30.9  36.1  3.1  14.0  7.4  17.2 
Work  35.2  37.7  74.9  5.6  10.5  5.8  18.0 
Dependent  67.0  33.5  28.2  2.1  11.9  5.4  19.7 
Other temporary  45.6  31.1  54.7  4.4  13.4  6.5  17.7 
Study/training               
    - for college  33.4  31.9  0.9  0.1  14.0  6.5  20.2 
    - for grad school  32.2  18.6  0  0  11.4  5.9  13.9 
    - for post-doc  27.9  39.6  63.4  2.3  15.9  8.0  17.3 
    - for other  45.4  27.4  39.5  2.9  15.0  7.0  20.4 
Observations  90,293  75,940 
 
Notes:  Means  of  patent  and  publication  sample  columns  1-2  and  wage  sample  columns  3-7, 
weighted with survey weights. Potential experience is measured from the year of receipt of highest 
degree. Mean years of experience include zeroes. The means of the dummy for any U.S. experience 
is  0.98-0.99  for  each  group.  Means  for  Americans  born  abroad  and  individuals  born  in  U.S. 
territories are not reported. 
 
 Appendix Table 2: Further weighted means of covariates by entry visa 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 













A. Immigrant vs native           
U.S. native  85.5  4.8  0.9  0.4  5.1 
Immigrant   86.3  8.0  1.1  1.2  6.9 
B.  Entry visa type           
Green card  85.1  4.9  1.0  4.3  7.1 
Work  92.1  5.4  0.6  0.3  6.2 
Dependent  81.0  7.5  1.4  1.4  7.3 
Other temporary  84.3  5.5  1.1  1.0  8.2 
Study/training           
    - for college  87.5  8.1  1.7  1.4  7.8 
    - for grad school  91.1  18.8  0.8  3.5  4.1 
    - for post-doc  94.5  38.2  0.1  2.0  5.4 
    - for other  85.3  12.0  2.3  4.7  8.6 
 
Note: Means of patent and publication sample, 90,293 observations, weighted with survey weights. 
University means a four-year post-secondary institution. Means for Americans born abroad and 
individuals born in U.S. territories are not reported. 
 Appendix Table 3: Determinants of log hourly wages: entry visa 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
































































































R-squared  0.00  0.07  0.13  0.17  0.19  0.21 
Field highest degree  --  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Highest degree  --  --  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sex, age, race  --  --  --  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Currently enrolled, 
tenure, self-employed  
--  --  --  --  Yes  Yes 
Region  --  --  --  --  --  Yes 
 
Notes: Coefficients from OLS regressions using 75,940 observations, weighted with survey weights, 
with log hourly wage as the dependent variable. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
omitted category is U.S. native. Each regression also includes dummies for Born American abroad 
and those born in U.S. territories. Field of highest degree is controlled for with 29 dummies, highest 
degree with dummies for master’s, doctorate and professional degrees, race with dummies for black 
non-Hispanic,  Hispanic  and  mixed-race  non-Hispanic,  age  with  a  cubic,  currently enrolled  with 
dummies for full-time master’s student, full-time doctoral student, and other student, tenure with a 
quadratic and region with 8 dummies for census region. 
 Appendix Table 4: Determinants of the probability of being granted a patent: entry visa  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
































































R-squared  0.02  0.16  0.19  0.22 
Field highest degree  --  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Highest degree  --  --  Yes  Yes 
Sex, age, race  --  --  --  Yes 
 
Notes: Marginal effects from probit regressions using 90,293 observations, weighted with survey 
weights, with whether a patent was granted as the dependent variable. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The omitted category is U.S. native. Each regression also includes dummies for Born 
American abroad and those born in U.S. territories. Field of highest degree is controlled for with 29 
dummies, highest degree with dummies for master’s, doctorate and professional degrees, race with 
dummies for black non-Hispanic, Hispanic and mixed-race non-Hispanic, age with a cubic. Appendix Table 5: Determinants of the probability of commercializing or licensing a patent: entry 
visa  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
































































R-squared  0.02  0.15  0.18  0.21 
Field highest degree  --  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Highest degree  --  --  Yes  Yes 
Sex, age, race  --  --  --  Yes 
 
Notes: Marginal effects from probit regressions using 90,293 observations, weighted with survey 
weights, with whether a patent was commercialized or licensed as the dependent variable. T-statistics 
are  reported  in  parentheses.  The omitted  category  is  U.S.  native.  Each regression  also  includes 
dummies for Born American abroad and those born in U.S. territories. Field of highest degree is 
controlled  for  with  29  dummies,  highest  degree  with  dummies  for  master’s,  doctorate  and 
professional degrees, race with dummies for black non-Hispanic, Hispanic and mixed-race non-
Hispanic, age with a cubic. 
 Appendix Table 6: Determinants of probability of publishing or writing papers: entry visa 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
















































































R-squared  0.01  0.03  0.11  0.12  0.14 
Field highest degree  --  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Highest degree  --  --  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sex, age, race  --  --  --  Yes  Yes 
Currently enrolled, 
working, working at 4 
year college/university 
--  --  --  --  Yes 
 
Notes: Marginal effects from probit regressions using 90,293 observations, weighted with survey 
weights, with whether the individual published a book or a journal article or authored a paper for 
presentation  at  a  major  conference  as  the  dependent  variable.  T-statistics  are  reported  in 
parentheses. The omitted category is U.S. native. Each regression also includes dummies for Born 
American abroad and those born in U.S. territories. Field of highest degree is controlled for with 29 
dummies, highest degree with dummies for master’s, doctorate and professional degrees, race with 
dummies for black non-Hispanic, Hispanic and mixed-race non-Hispanic, age with a cubic, currently 
enrolled with dummies for full-time master’s student, full-time doctoral student, and other student. Appendix Table 7: Determinants of probability of publishing or writing more than six papers: entry 
visa 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
















































































R-squared  0.03  0.06  0.18  0.19  0.23 
Field highest degree  --  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Highest degree  --  --  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sex, age, race  --  --  --  Yes  Yes 
Currently enrolled, 
working, working at 4 
year college/university 
--  --  --  --  Yes 
 
Notes: Marginal effects from probit regressions using 90,293 observations, weighted with survey 
weights, with whether the sum of the individual’s book and journal article publications and papers 
authored for presentation at a major conference is greater than six as the dependent variable. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. The omitted category is U.S. native. Each regression also 
includes dummies for Born American abroad and those born in U.S. territories. Field of highest 
degree is controlled for with 29 dummies, highest degree with dummies for master’s, doctorate and 
professional degrees, race with dummies for black non-Hispanic, Hispanic and mixed-race non-
Hispanic, age with a cubic, currently enrolled with dummies for full-time master’s student, full-time 
doctoral student, and other student. 
  
 